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Once again, the usually clandestine undocumented person is emerging in
the public spotlight as a prominent societal concern. Certain interests advocate
for their explusion alleging that they cause unemployment, depress wages,
drain public assistance funds and cause or contribute to various other social
maladies.) Amid the hyperbole and hysteria, 2 however, there exists a distinct
absence of reliable data to support even the most elementary of these accusa-
tions.3 This lack of an adequate factual basis, taken in tandum with the
traditional emotional milieu surrounding the issue of immigration, makes the
formulation of an effective rational policy very difficult.
The continuing entrance of undocumented persons into the United States,
and how to deal with those already here, presents a major domestic and foreign
relations dilemma. 4 The Carter administration has responded to this issue by
proposing legislation to reduce and regulate the presence of undocumented
persons in the United States.5 On October 12, 1977, a bill prepared by the
administration, the Alien Adjustment and Employment Act, was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 9531 by Rep. Peter W. Rodino,
Jr.6 Shortly thereafter, on October 28, 1977, the identical bill was introduced
in the Senate as S. 2252 by Senators James 0. Eastland, Edward M. Kennedy,
Lloyd Bensten and Dennis DiConcini. 7 The Alien Adjustment and Employment
Act contains two principal provisions. First, the administration proposes a
two-tier adjustment of status as a means of regulating undocumented persons
*B.A., University of Arizona, 1976; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame, 1979.
1. See, e.g., A. Fragomen, The Illegal Alien: Criminal or Economic Refugee?. Center for Migration
Studies (1973); J. Bustamante, The Wetback Deviant, 77 Am. J. Soc. 706 (1972); A Portes, Return
.of the Wetback, 11 Society 40-46 (Mar/Apr. 1974).
2. Much of the hyperbole contributing to the hysteria surrounding the issue of undocumented persons is
the result of irresponsible statements made by some high governmental officials. The problem is further
exacerbated by the propagation of these factually unsupported statements in the media. See, e.g.. L.
Chapman, Jr., Illegal Aliens: A Time To Call A Halt!, Readers Digest (Oct. 1976); W.B. Saxbe,
Address by Honorable William B. Saxbe, Attorney General of the United States, before the Cameron
County and Hidalgo County Bar Associations, Brownsville, Texas, (Oct. 1974). For a critique of
media reporting on this issue, see S. Jacoby, Immigration and the News Media: A Journalistic Failure.
Migration Today, Vol. 5, No. 2, at 20 (Apr. 1977).
3. With regard to the factual basis of the present legislative proposal, Prof. Wayne A. Cornelius of
M.I.T. has said, "No other major policy affecting the livelihood of millions of people, in this country
and abroad, has been formulated on the basis of such inadequate supporting evidence." W.A. Cornelius,
Undocumented Immigration: A Critique of the Carter Administrations' Policy Proposals, Migration
Today, Vol. 5, No. 4, at 6 (Oct. 1977).
4. For the foreign relations implications of this issue, see R. Fagan, The Realities of U.S. - Mexican
Relations, 55 Foreign Affairs 685 (July 1977); Domestic Council Committee On Illegal Aliens,
Preliminary Report, at 52 (Dec. 1976).
5. H.R. Doc. 95-202, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 4, 1977). The President's message delineated the main
sections of his immigration policy and elaborated on practical implementation considerations.
6. H.R. 9531, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill was referred to the Committee on Judiciary which
has assigned it to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law.
7. S. 2252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary which
has assigned it to the Subcommittee on Immigration.
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who have resided in the United States as of specific dates.8 Second, the
administration seeks to reduce the flow of undocumented persons into the
United States by restricting employment opportunities through employer
sanctions. 9
The purpose of this note is to analyze the validity of the basic policy
assumptions supporting the administration's proposal and to determine the
probability of the bill accomplishing its avowed purpose of "reducing" and
"regulating" the presence of undocumented persons in the United States. The
administration's espousal of adjustment of status (so-called amnesty) is laudable
as a humane and practical means of dealing with undocumented persons already
in this country. In addition, the expressed preemption of State and local law
imposing employer sanctions reflects a positive step toward establishing uniformity
in the application of immigration policy. 10 Nevertheless, a circumspect analysis
of the relevent historical and socioeconomic factors indicates that the effectiveness
of this legislation is questionable, and its potential for generating and shielding
discrimination against minorities, especially Chicanos, is formidable.
HISTORY
For almost a century following the signing of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the policy of the United States was one of open and unrestricted
immigration. 11 It was not until 1882 that the first general immigration law
was enacted, 12 providing for a head tax and the exclusion of certain classes
of people. Restrictionist proponents continued to make insistent demands, usually
stoked in times of economic downturns and predicated on ethnic and racial
misconceptions, 13 for increased restriction of immigration. Although incremental
restrictions were imposed in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 14 the
culmination of restrictionist efforts-during this phase did not come about until
1917 with the passage of the Literacy Act.15
8. H.R. 9531 and S. 2252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at §§2-4 (1977).
9. Id.. §5.
10. See De Canas v Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). There, the Supreme Court ruled that a California statute
(Cal. Labor Code §2805) which imposed sanctions on employers of undocumented persons, was a
regulation of labor rather than immigration. Thus, the Court rejected the argument that this state
law interfered with exclusive federal power over immigration. Since this ruling, numerous states and
one municipality have passed employer sanctions. See Centro de Inmigracion, State and Local
Legislative Activity, Georgetown University Law Center (Nov. 1977).
11. C. Wittle, Immigration Policy Prior to World War I, Annals Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci. (1949);
Educational and Public Welfare Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Illegal Alien:t Analysis and Background, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives,
at 38 (June 1977). (Hereinafter cited as Illegal Aliens: Analysis and Background.) See generally Jaffee,
The Philosophy of Our Immigration Law, 21 Law and Contemp. Prob. 358 (1956).
12. Act of August 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214. This act extended the classes that were excluded in the Act of
March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477.
13. See Hignam, American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective, 21 Law and Contemp. Prob.
213 (1956). Prof. Hignam delineates the historical context in which the early U.S. immigration policy
was formed. See also J. Bustamante, The Historical Context of Undocumented Mexican Immigration
to the United States, Aztlan, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 257 (Fall 1972).
14. See Act of February 26, 1885, 23 Stat. 332; Act of February 23, 1887, 24 Stat. 414. These alien
contract labor laws forbade the prepaying of transportation of an immigrant to the United States in
return for services. See also Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat 1084; Act of March 3, 1893, 27 Stat.
569. The Act of 1891 placed in the hands of the federal government the exclusive function of inspection
and regulation of newly arriving immigrants, and it extended the classes of persons precluded from
entering the country. The Act of 1893 established a special board of inquiry to pass on the admissibility
of arriving immigrants.
15. Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874. The act's main provision provided for the exclusion of all
aliens over sixteen years of age who were physically able to read but did not read English or some
other language or dialect. This act is probably the first sweeping victory for restrictionist forces, but
its impact on limiting immigration was nugatory.
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The Chinese Exclusion Act of 188216 and the Japanese-American Gen-
tlemen's Agreement of 190717 had the result of excluding Oriental labor from
the Southwest. As a result of this shortage of labor and the internal rural to
urban migration of this era, a demand for cheap labor was created in the
expanding fields and factories of the Southwest.1 8 The railroad had opened up
new markets and irrigation had expanded new areas for cultivation. Consequently,
American capitalists and nascent agribusiness, faced with a strong and growing
restrictionist movement, had to seek alternative sources of cheap labor. The
proximity of Mexico to the Southwest and the relative poverty of its people,
made it a logical and practical place to turn for cheap laboi. It is the ebb
and flow of this demand for Mexican cheap labor that has constituted the
underlying basis for United States immigration policy toward Mexico. 19
The immigration of Mexicans was covered under the 1917 Literacy Act
and had the act's provisions been enforced, Mexican immigration would have
been negligible. In 1918, however, the Commissioner General of Immigration,
with them approval of the Secretary of Labor, issued a Departmental Order20
exempting Mexican immigration from the provisions of the 1917 act and the
contract labor laws.21 The exemption was justified on a war-caused manpower
shortage, but its existence continued long after the termination of the war.
The fundamental policy approach of the United States was thus established:
the government would relax immigration laws or their enforcement when it
became desirable to import Mexican workers, but the government would prevent
permanent settlement by invoking restrictionist laws when it became desirable
to deport these workers. 22
The enactment of the quota laws of 192123 and 192424 ushered in the
quantitative phase of immigration restrictions. The national origins formula
embodied in those laws effectively limited European immigration to the point
where large scale immigration ceased.25 Exponents of the national origins quota
were only temporarily satisfied, however, and soon thereafter they clamored
for the inclusion of the Western Hemisphere under the ambit of the 1924
act. Thus, they extended many of the ethnic and racial arguments levied
against Southern and Eastern Europeans to Mexicans. Rep. John 0. Box
capsulized the gravamen of their concern:
16. Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58.
17. 1 Foreign Rel. U.S. 766 (1907); For full text, see 2 U.S. Dept. of State, Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relation of the United States, 1924, at 337-71 (1939).
18. C. McWilliams, North From Mexico (1968). See generally C. McWilliams, Factories in The Fields
(1971). John Gardner, vice president during FDR's first term, publicly stated before a congressional
committee, "In order to allow landowners now to make a profit of their farms, they want to get the
cheapest labor they can find, and if they get the Mexican labor it enables them to make a profit."
V. Martinez, Illegal Immigration and the Labor Force, Current Issues in Social Policy, at 101 (1976).
19. J. Samora, Los Mojados: The Wetback Story (1971); R. Acuna, Occupied America: The Chicano
Struggle Toward Liberation, Ch. 6 (1972); Illegal Alien: Analysis and Background supra note 11,
at 48.
20. Department Order No. 52461/202. See U.S. Immigration Ser. Bull., Vol. I, No. 3, at 1-4 (1918).
21. Act of February 26, 1885, 23 Stat. 332; Act of February 23, 1887, 24 Stat. 414.
22. G. Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An Historical Perspective, 2
Chicano L. Rev. 66 (1975). Prof. Cardenas' article is an important contribution to the study of
Mexican immigration history.
23. Act of May 19, 1921, 42 Stat. 5. This act was -viewed as a stop-gap measure to hold the gate while
a permanent law was planned. However, it is important since it established the policy of national
origins quota based on a percentage of the pre-existing national composition of the American population.
24. Act of May 26, 1924, 43 Stat. 153. The basic thrust of this act was to make the 1921 Act permanent
with a few revisions.
25. Cardenas, supra note 22, at 69. See also U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual
Report, at 53-55 (1973).
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The Mexican peon is a mixture of Mediterranean-blooded Spanish peasant
with low grade Indians who did not fight to extinction but submitted and
multiplied as serfs. Into this was fused much negro slave blood. This blend
of low grade Spaniard, peonized Indians and negro slave mixes with negro,
mullatoes and other mongrels, and some sorry whites,' already here. The
prevention of such mongrelization and degradation it causes is one of the
purposes of our laws which the admission of these people tend to defeat.
26
Ultimately, the Western Hemisphere was not placed under the national origins
quota because of staunch opposition by business interests and governmental
agencies that were concerned with the availability of Mexican labor.
27
The largest admittance of Mexican immigrants into the U.S. occured in
the 1920's and there is little doubt that government inducements and business
encouragements contributed significantly to this large migration. 28 The
Mexican immigrant, however, was more tolerated as a laborer then welcomed
as a citizen. The government's Dillingham Commission29 limpidly expressed
this prevailing attitude toward the Mexican immigrant when it said "it was
evident that in the case of the Mexican, he was less desirable as a citizen
than as a laborer." Nevertheless, the commission recommended the continued
use of Mexican labor.
30
U.S. government policy had two basic aspects. First, the availability and
access of Mexican labor to U.S. employers had to be maintained. Second,
adequate laws and enforcement mechanisms had to be established for the
explusion of the immigrant when he became unwanted as a laborer. In response
to the second aspect, the Border Patrol was, established in 192431 and the Act
of 192932 made it a felony for an alien to enter the country illegally. The
legal groundwork was thus laid for future deportation of "illegal aliens".
The depression of 1929 created the political and economic climate that
made the Mexican worker undesirable, except as a scapegoat. 33 The Border
Patrol was mobilized and existing immigration laws began to be strictly
enforced. 34 The restrictive efforts were so successful that while immigration
from Mexico into the U.S. decreased, emigration and repatriation from the
26. See 69 Cong. Rec. 2817-18 (1928). For a compilation of congressional statements and testimony
illustrating racist perceptions, see Greenfield, Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 695 (1975).
27. Cardenas, supra note 22, at 69.
28. Another significant factor is this mass immigration of people from Mexico was the social upheaval
caused by the Mexican Revolution of 1910. See generally H. Parkes, A History of Mexico (1969);
C. Cumberland, Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity (1968); J. Wilkie, A. Michaeis, Revolution in
Mexico: Years of Upheaval 1910-1940 (1969).
29. Act of February 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 897, created and defined the duties of the immigration commission
which is popularly referred to as the Dillingham Commission after Senator William P. Dillingham,
the commission's chairman. Its 42-volume report had an immense influence on the Act of 1917 and
both the 1921 and 1924 quota laws.
30. Abstracts of Reports, Immigration Commission, Vol. 1, S. Doc. 747, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess., at 682-691
(1911).
31. Act of May 28, 1924, 43 Stat. 240, as amended by the Act of February 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049.
For a description of the impact of the Border Patrol on undocumented persons work relations and
conditions, see J. Bustamante, The Historical Context of Undocumented Mexican Immigration To
The United States, Atzlan, Vol. 3, No. 2, at 270-71 (Fall 1972).
32. Act of March 4, 1929, 45 Stat. 1551.
33. For an excellent account of the plight of the Mexican immigrant during the depression period, see A.
Hoffman, Unwanted Mexican Americans in The Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures 1929-39
(1974).
34. "Merely by a rigid enforcement of old regulations, such as tfie public charge proviso of. 1882, and
the contract labor ban of 1885, the consulars who issued visas to prospective Mexican immigrants
drasticly reduced their number." Hignam, supra note 13, at 232; see also 72 Cong. Rec. 7111 (1930).
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U.S. increased. 35 In the frenzy to deport the "illegal alien" many of the
constitutional rights and legal status of aliens were given only passing
consideration by the Border Patrol and other enforcement agencies. 36 This
disregard of peoples' rights prompted one writer to comment: "The restrictive
and repressive immigration policies-of the 1920's led to one of the most sordid
pictures in law enforcement history."
37
The mobilization and preparation for the Second World War brought
renewed economic prosperity with the corresponding demand for cheap labor.
As before, the demand for Mexican labor did not manifest itself in liberalized
opportunities for permanent legal immigration. Rather, methods were devised
by which Mexican workers could be imported on a legal temporary basis. A
bilateral agreement between Mexico and the United States established the
Bracero Program in 1942.38 Though the need for the Bracero Program was
attributed to the labor shortage caused by the war, the program was not
terminated until 1964. What was intended as an emergency program became
the principal conduit for temporary legal immigration of Mexicans for more
than two decades.
39
The 10-year period between 1944-54 was a time of an unprecedented illegal
immigration from Mexico. 40 The same economic interests and factors that
established the Bracero Program also stimulated the immigration of undocumented
persons. In fact, the existence of the Bracero Program may have encouraged
the northern migration of the Mexican campesino.4 1 The influx of undoc-
umented persons and.the toleration of their presence in large numbers appears
very similar to the influx of legal European immigration during periods of
rapid, economic expansion, 42 with, the exception that the Mexican immigrant
was always susceptible to expulsion.
In the late 1940's and early 50's the demand for cheap labor contracted
while illegal immigration continued. Thus, pressure was created for the
government to stem the "wetback invasion."'43 In 1954, the infamous "Operation
Wetback" 44 was launched and with military proficiency. As much as one-sixth
of the total Mexican-origin population living in this country was deported.
45
From 1954 to 1964 the immigration of undocumented persons remained
relatively small.
A-survey of recent legislative activity reveals a continued use of restrictive
immigration proposals as anodyne for current economic ills. As the economic
situation becomes more distressful, greater efforts are made to curb the influx
35. Cardenas, supra note 22, at 74.
36. The Wickersham Report characterized the method of apprehension and examination of the alien as-unconstitutional, tyrannic and oppressive." 5 National Commission On Law Observance and Enforcement,
Report of Enforcement of the Deportation Laws of the United States (1931).
37. Wasserman, The Immigration and Nationality of 1952 -. Our New Alien And Sedition Act, 27
Temple L. Quar. 69 (1953).
38. For a treatment of the various dimensions of the Bracero Program, see E. Galarza, Merchants of
Labor: The Mexican Bracero History (1964); R. Craig, The Bracero Program; Interest Groups and
Foreign Policy (1971); President's Commission on Migratory-Labor Report, Migratory Labor in
American Agriculture (1951).
39 Cardenas, supra note 22, at 75-76.
40. Hadley, A Critical Analysis of the Wetback Problem, 21 Law and Contemp. Prob. 334 (1956).
41. J. Samora, Los Majados: The Wetback Story (1971); Note, Commuters, Illegals And American
Farmworkers: The Need For A Broader Approach to Domestic Farm Labor Problems, 48 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 482 (1973).
42. Cardenas, supra note 22, at 80.
43. The term "wetback" has obvious offensive and denigrating racist connotations to Chicanos.
44. Samora, supra note 41, at 33-57.
45. Cardenas, supra note 22, at 81.
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of undocumented persons. These efforts manifest themselves in restrictionist
proposals that, because of a lack of an understanding of the -historical and
economic role of the undocumented person, are either overly simplistic or a
source of greater pressure for undocumented migration.
The Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 197646 is illustrative of
a recent enactment that contributes to a greater inflow of undocumented
persons. Since 1969, Mexico has been sending an average of 40,000 legal
immigrants per year to the United States.47 The 1976 Amendments drastically
reduced the permissable number of legal immigrants to 20,000 per year.48 This
severe limitation of legal immigration is likely to contribute to greater illegal
immigration. In evidence of this concern, The New York Times reported that
an Immigration and Naturalization Service spokesman said, "pressures caused
by reduced quota for Mexico would probably produce an increase in the
number of Mexicans seeking to enter the United States illegally. ' '49 In
addition, President Ford implicitly acknowledged the bill would have the result
of creating greater pressure for illegal migration at the signing ceremony.50
Imposing sanctions on employers of undocumented persons have become a
popular method of restricting illegal immigration.5' Proposals containing
employer sanctions were introduced in the 92nd, 93rd and 94th Congress by
Representative Rodino. 52 The basic thrust of these provisions is to penalize
employers that knowingly hire undocumented persons.5 3 These sanctions are
intended to remove the "economic incentives" that draw these people illegally
to. the United States.54 Exponents of employer sanctions, however, fail to
recognize that the historical utilization of Mexican labor, and the economic
benefit derived from their employment, provides strong motivation for the
continued use of these workers. Vague and standardless legislation, that relies
to a large degree on voluntary compliance,55 is proposed to curtail a longstanding
practice that yields considerable economic benefit to employers.
The Carter administration's proposed Alien Adjustment and Employment
Act appears to be a mere extension of past Rodino bills.5 6 Although the
administration bill is more carefully drafted and contains certain unique
46. Act of October 20, 1976, Public Law 89-236, 79 Stat. 2703.
47. Illegal Aliens: Analysis and Background, supra note 11, at 41.
48. See G. Reyes, What Is The Eilberg Bill and What Will Its Affect Be?, La Raza, Vol. 3, No. 1, at
15 (Spring 1977).
49. The New York Times, Oct. 24, 1976, at 26.
50. President Ford voiced concern "about one aspect of the legislation which has the effect of reducing
the legal immigration from Mexico." Weekly Compulation of Presidential Documents, at 1548 (Oct.
25, 1976).
51. Federal efforts to penalize employers of undocumented persons date back to 1951 and 1952 when.
Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois introduced bills which made it a felony for an employer to hire
undocumented immigrants. See Centro de Inmigracion, Laws Prohibiting Employment of Undocumented
Workers: An Unjust Solution to U.S. Economic Problems, Georgetown Law Center, at I (May 1977);
see also N. Copp, Wetback and Braceros: Mexican Migrant Laborers and American Immigration
Policy 1930-1960, at 84-94 (1963).
52. H.R. 16188, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 982, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); for an analysis
of this legislation, see Note, The Undocumented Worker: The Controversy Takes A New Turn, 3
Chicano L. Rev. 164 (1976). H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); for an analysis of this legislation,
see Note, The Rodino Bill On Illegal Aliens: A Legislative Note, 3 J. Legis. 39 (1976).
53. The employment of undocumented persons has never been deemed unlawful under §274(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. This section prohibits the harboring, transportating and smuggling
of undocumented persons, but ordinary employment practices are not construed as harboring.
54. H.R. Rep. No. 94-506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1975)
55. Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, Preliminary Report, at 112 (Dec. 1976).
56. "The Administration's proposal is more the result of mindless legislative momentum then detailed
analysis. This Legislative momentum began to build with Representative Peter W. Rodino's introduction
of an undocumented alien bill in the second session of the Ninety-second Congress." Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Statement of Position Regarding the Administration's Undocumented
Alien Legislative Proposal, at 2 (Nov. 1977).
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provisions, its main provisions and policy foundations are substantially those
of past Rodino bills, especially of H.R. 8713.57 Unfortunately, the Alien
Adjustment and Employment Act also fails to address the basic reasons for
the presence of undocumented persons in our society, namely, Mexico's
languishing economy and U.S. desire for cheap labor. 5
8
POLICY RATIONALE
President Carter's message to Congress expressly or implicitly mentioned
three policy concerns that support passage of the Alien Adjustment and
Employment Act (hereinafter the administration bill). 59 The administration bill
addresses the concerns of: (1) displacement of native workers, (2) the depressing
effect on wages and working conditions, and (3) the drain on public assistance
funds caused by undocumented persons. An analysis of the administration bill
requires at least a cursory examination of its underlying policy rationale.
The lack of reliable data is a major impediment to the formulation of a
rational immigration policy. 6° Basic requisites such as the size of the undocumented
population remain unconfirmed. 61 Nonetheless, an evaluation of the admin-
istration's policy concerns with available data from three recent studies on
undocumented persons is elucidating. The studies represent research conducted
by David North and Marion Houstoun for the U.S. Department of Labor; by
Vic Villalpando, et al., for the County of San Diego, and by Prof. Wayne A.
Cornelius of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
62
The central complaint lodged against the Mexican 63 undocumented person
is that his employment causes unemployment for native American workers.
The Villalpando and Cornelius studies assert there is no direct evidence of
displacement of native labor caused by the employment of undocumented
57. See H.R. 8713, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
58. See Preliminary Report, supra note 55, at 62. Prof. Cornelius believes the most salient reason for
recent illegal immigration is the "economic mess in Mexico." W.A. Cornelius, Undocumented
Immigration: A Critique of the Carter Administrations' Policy Proposals, Migration Today, Vol, 5,
No. 4, at 18 (Oct. 1977); but Prof. Cardenas believes the "problem is . ..one whose seed has been
planted time and again by the United States when it has been in need of Mexican labor." Cardenas,
supra note 22, at 89. MALDEF states, "It is generally agreed that undocumented immigration is
prompted by a combination of unemployment and low wages in source countries, and the availability
of employment and relatively high wages presently existing in this country." MALDEF, supra note.
56, at 23.
59. H.R. Doc. 95-202, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 4, 1977).
60. See, e.g., G. Cardenas, Public Data On Mexican 'Immigration Into The United States: A Critical
Evaluation, Current Issues in Social Policy, at 127 (1976); but see, V. Briggs, Jr. Illegal Immigration
and the American Labor Force: The Use of "Soft" Data for Analysis, Current Issues In Social Policy,
at 113 (1976).
61. See W.A. Cornelius, Illegal Migration To The United States: Recent Research Findings. Policy
Implications, And Research Priorities, Center For International Studies, M.I.T., at 1 (1977).
62. V. Villalpando, et al., A Study of the Socioeconomic Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of San
Diego, Human Resources Agency, County of San Diego (1977); D. North, M. Houstoun, The
Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market: An Exploratory Study, prepared
for U.S. Department of Labor (1976); W.A. Cornelius, Illegal Migration To The United States:
Recent Research Findings, Policy Implications, And Research Priorities, Center for International
Studies, M.I.T. (1977).
63. It is important that comments in this section be specifically limited to the Mexican undocumented
persons whom experts believe constitutes 60 to 65% of illegal immigration flow. This specific reference
to the Mexican component is necessary because most of the research and conclusions are based on
research conducted with this particular element. Subsequent mention of "undocumented person" in
this particular section should be construed as "Mexican undocumented person". Since the administration




persons. 64 Professor Cornelius explains "[w]orkers cannot be displaced if they
are not there . . . ", noting that jobs occupied by undocumented persons are
the least desirable and thus unattractive to the native worker who, even if
unemployed, may have more attractive alternatives for his sustenance. 65Villalpando
cites a recent Immigration and Naturalization Service project to replace jobs
held by apprehended undocumented workers with citizens as illustrative of this
proposition. The 340 jobs opened by apprehensions were eventually filled, but
not by citizens. Villalpando notes that "90 percent of the positions were
occupied by 'commuter workers' from Baja California, Mexico."' 66 Similar job
replacement projects have reached like conclusions. 6
7
A corollary of the job displacement thesis is the allegation that employment
of undocumented persons depresses wages and causes poor working conditions.
North and Houstoun suggest "that the most significant impact of the illegal
is on local labor standards in the area where they congregate. '68 But, as
Professor Cornelius points out, this contention has not been substantiated. 69 This
allegation is weakened by results from these studies reflecting that a relatively
small portion of undocumented persons receive less than minimum wage. Thus,
their employment does not appear to depress wages below the legal minimum
to any great extent.70 Moreover, the Cornelius study observes that undocumented
persons are usually employed in small marginal firms and industries: where
the exploitation of undocumented labor is a financial modus operandi.
Consequently, he argues that the removal of undocumented persons does not
necessarily translate into more jobs or better working conditions for the native
worker since businesses have other alternatives Open to them.71 An obvious
alternative is to mechanize or, because of their inability to secure labor at
prevailing wages and conditions, they simply go out of business. 72 A recent
editorial in The Wall Street Journal echoed this concern when it stated, "[]n
a city like New York, which has been driving away business through high
costs, the illegal may well be providing the margin for survival for entire
sectors of the economy. . . . ,73 In short, the removal of undocumented workers
does not necessarily create more employment opportunities for native workers.
The popular perception of the undocumented person as a parasite living
off welfare is refuted by all three studies. 74 Even the administration admits
that "they are not now a major drain on public assistancd programs paid for
64. Cornelius, supra note 62, at 8; Villalpando, supra note 62, at 50. North and Houstoun determined
that undocumented persons do not displace American workers within the skilled labor market. They
contend, however, that they compete for jobs within the secondary labor market. North, Houstoun, supra
note 62, at 162-163.
65. Cornelius, supra note 62, at 9.
66. Villalpando, supra note 62, at 62.
67. Los Angeles Times, July 3, 1975, at I col. 4.
68. North, Houstoun, supra note 62, at 159.
69. Cornelius, supra note 62, at 6. See also M. Piore, Undocumented Workers and United States
Immigration Policy, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., at 3 (1977).
70. For a summary of average wage per hour for all three studies, see Cornelius, supra note 62, at 13-14.
71. Cornelius, supra note 62, at 11.
72. "The argument is sometimes advanced that illegal aliens do the job that all legal resident workers
find so distasteful that these jobs would not be filled if there were no illegal aliens. In this view,
illegal aliens are not substitutes in employment for legal workers because the latter would not accept
the jobs the illegals fill. To attract legal workers to such jobs money wages and working conditions
would have to be increased by so much that firms that now rely on illegal workers would go out of
business or substantially change their conditions of employment through a substitution of capital for
labor. The curtailment of the use of illegal alien labor may then have little effect on legal worker
employment, but would raise costs to these firms and raise the relative prices of the items they
produce." Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens, Preliminary Report, at 160-161.
73. Editorial, The Wall Street Journal, June 21, 1977 at 8.




by taxpayers." 75 An often overlooked fact is that undocumented persons pay
taxes through automatic wage deductions (they rarely file income tax returns),
through sales tax on retail purchases, and through property tax calculated into
rent payments. 76 In San Diego County, an area with a heavy undocumented
population, 77 Villalpando found that undocumented persons receive around $2
million in public assistance while they contribute approximately $48 million
in tax funds.
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In light of these studies, the administration's policy rationale appears
unsound and unsupported by available data. Although the presence of
undocumented persons does present a serious dilemma, it is not for the reasons
enunciated by the administration. The fai lure to realistically perceive and define
the problem will inevitably lead to inadequate solutions, as illustrated by the
administration bill's substantive provisions.
SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
The administration bill has two principal objectives: (1) to adjust to lawful
permanent resident alien status those undocumented persons who have resided
in the United States continuously since prior to January 1, 1970, and to adjust
-to a temporary resident alien status those undocumented persons who have
resided in the United States continuously since prior to January 1, 1977, and
(2) to restrict employment opportunities for undocumented persons in the
United States through employer sanctions. 79 The basic infirmities of these
provisions are primarily a result of the speculative policy rationale from which
they emanate. The provisions, however, merit analysis to determine their specific
practical impact and to evaluate the probability of accomplishing their objectives.
1. Adjustment of Status
The administration bill proposes a two-tier approach to the question of
regulating undocumented persons already in the United States. This so-called
amnesty provision has dominated media reports and public discussion, relegating
other important features of this legislative proposal to obscurity. Notwithstanding
the public attention received by this provision, there still remains a lack of
understanding as to its specific contents and potential ramifications.
First, the administration proposes to amend the registry provision, section
249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,80 to authorize permanent resident
alien status to those undocumented persons who have "continuously resided"
in the United States prior to January 1, 1970, and who are otherwise admis-
sable.81 Persons applying under this provision would have to provide "normal
documentary proof' of their residence and the adjustment of status would not
be charged to any numerical limitation.
75. Office of the White House Press Secretary, Undocumented Aliens: Fact Sheet, Aug. 4, 1977.
76. Orange County Task Force On Medical Care For Illegal Aliens, The Economic Impact of
Undocumented Immigrants On Public Health Services in Orange County: 'A Study of Medical Costs,
Tax Contributions, and Health Needs of Undocumented Immigrants, (Preliminary Draft) at 20 (Orange
County Board of Supervisors) (Mar. 1978).
77. In 1975 it accounted for 43% of the total apprehensions of undocumented persons along the southern
border and 25% of all apprehensions nation-wide.
78. Villalpando, supra note 62, at 57, 173.
79. H.R. 9351 and S. 2252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §§2-5 (1977).
80. Act of June 27, 1952, Public Law 82-114, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §1259 (1970).
81. H.R. 9351 and S. 2252, 95th Cong., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (1977).
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The permanent adjustment of status proposed by the administration is
laudable as a humane and practical method of dealing with undocumented
persons residing in the United States. Its time limitation, however, is far too
restrictive to be of value to the bulk of undocumented persons in this country.
The selection of January 1, 1970, as the cut-off date has the effect of excluding
the vast majority of undocumented persons from qualifying for permanent
resident status.82 The Mexican American Legal and Educational Fund expressed
its concern with the restrictive cut-off date by stating:
Under the Administration's standard, hundreds of thousands of undocumented
persons who have made substantial contributions to American society, and
who have developed binding ties to their local community, would be denied
legal residence status, and shunted into the netherworld of nondeportable
status.8 3
By proposing a seven-year residence requirement the potential salutary effect
of this commendable provision is needlessly minimized.8 4
Contrary to the popular notion that the administration's amnesty proposal
is a major policy innovation, it does not appear to offer anything substantially
different than what is included in current law. Section 244 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act provides relief from deportation for aliens "physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceeding the date of such application" for "suspension of
deportation."' 85 Under section 244 an alien, if he has resided in the U.S.
continuously for seven years, can obtain relief from deportation. Under this
section, however, he has the added burden of proving good moral character
and extreme hardship.86 Thus, except for removing the minor requirement of
having to establish good moral character and extreme hardship, the administration's
adjustment of, status provision is substantially the same as section 244. In
effect, it is a mere modification of existing law rather than an innovative
policy proposal.
Second, the administration proposes to accord a unique temporary resident
alien status (hereinafter TRA) to undocumented persons who have "continuously
resided" in the United States prior to January 1, 1977.87 Persons granted
TRA status would be permitted to legally reside in the U.S. for at least five
years with authority to work, but are not guaranteed permanent residency at
the conclusion of the five years. The TRA status also carries with it restricted
82. See W.A. Cornelius, Illegal Migration To The United States: Recent Research Findings, Policy
Implications, and Research Priorities, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., at-7 (1977). "Among
the illegals in my study 71% had remained in the U.S. for 4 months or less during their initial trip.
Fifty-four percent had stayed for 4 months or less during their most recent work experience in the
U.S.; only 11% had worked in the U.S. for more than 1 year before returning to Mexico." See also
D. North, M. Houstoun, The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market:
An Exploratory Study, prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor (1976).
83. Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Statements of Position Regarding the
Administration's Undocumented Alien Legislative Proposal, at 26 (1977).
84. For this reason other legislation proposals have contained much shorter time restrictions. See, e.g., H.R.
6093, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which proposed a January 1, 1977 cut-off date; H.R. 4338, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), which sets July 4, 1976 as the cut-off date.
85. 8 U.S.C. §1254 (1970).
86. The administration bill does require, however, that an applicant, under its adjustment of status provision,
be otherwise admissable under §212 of the I.N.A. On the other hand, suspension of deportation relief
under §244 of the I.N.A. is not precluded by inadmissability under §212.
87. H.R. 9531 and S. 2252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §4 (1977).
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constitutional and statutory rights.88 Under TRA status, a person is precluded
from reunifying his family in the U.S. and is denied eligibility for such federal
social service benefits as medical assistance programs under Title XIX,
supplemental security income under Title XVI, and aid to families with
dependent children under Title IV of the Social Security Act,89 and is also
denied eligibility under the Food Stamp Act of 1964.90
President Carter has described the purpose of the TRA grant as preserving
"a decision on the final status of these undocumented aliens, until much more
precise information about their number, location, family size, and economic
situation can be collected and reviewed." 91 This avowed purpose of collecting
information through the use of a TRA status grant, however, may be thwarted
by the very design of the provision. Registration under this provision will also
provide precise information regarding the location of undocumented persons,
thereby facilitating their eventual deportation. Consequently, it is unrealistic
to assume that undocumented persons will be motivated to compromise their
anonymity for a promise of a five year legal status with the possibility of
deportation at its end, particularly since once in the U.S. the probability of
being deported is very remote 92
Moreover, the administration's TRA status is objectionable in that instead
of eliminating this sub-class of people, it legally institutionalizes this second-
class status. For the right not to be deported, the undocumented person is
required to sacrifice family ties, to pay taxes without the reciprocal benefit
of public assistance in time of need, and generally to exist with restricted
legal rights. 93 The characterization of the TRA grant as confering the "right
to work" may. be misleading since it is uncertain whether such a right carries
with it any assurance of equal employment opportunities in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 94 There, the Court
held that job discrimination on the basis of alienage was not actionable under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In addition, workers under. TRA status are left in an ambiguous position
as to what rights they can claim under the administration bill. For example,
it is uncertain whether TRA workers have access to unemployment insurance
or workmen's compensation. 95 It is also uncertain whether these workers would
have a right to .join trade unions. In the absence of these basic protections,
workers under the TRA grant will be reluctant to voice complaints about work
related matters and may consequently be placed in an economically vulnerable
position.96 Thus, the TRA grant propounded by the administration makes the
88. Senator Bensten expressed his concern about TRA status, describing it as "a sort of second-class
residency that is inconsistant with our notion of democracy and may constitute a tacit admission of
our inability to come to grips with a problem of this magnitude and complexity." See 123 Cong.
Rec. S. 18067 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
89. 42 U.S.C. §1381 et seq. (1970).
90. 7 U.S.C. §2011 et seq. (1970).
91. H.R. Doc. 95-202, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (Aug. 4, 1977).
92. Given the I.N.S. enforcement practices of concentrating on the border and the possibility that this
force will be substantially strengthened under the administration proposal for more Border Patrol
personnel, the decision not to accept the TRA grant is eminently rational - the possibility of being
apprehended once in the interior is minimal while the possibility of returning after being deported in
five years is greatly reduced. Hence, it is possible that the TRA status grant will not be successful
in drawing undocumented persons from their clandestine existence. See Cornelius, supra note 82, at
8.; Preliminary Report, supra note 72, at 73.
93. MALDEF, supra note 83, at 35.
94. 414 U.S. 86 (1976).
95. MALDEF, supra note 83, at 33.
96. See P. Schey, Carter's Immigration Proposal: A Windfall For Big Business, Anathema For Undocumented
Persons, Agenda, Vol. 7, No. 5, at 11 (Sept./Oct. 1977).
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undocumented person a legally recognized second-class person and leaves him
in an economically disadvantaged position.
As noted above, an effect of the TRA grant will be to create a work
force of second-class persons. In the past, the absence of such a labor force
has caused business interests to oppose employer sanction legislation because
they feared the availability of cheap labor might be jeopardized. 97 While it
appears that this effect may enhance the probability of the bill's passage, it
is questionable whether such a temporary work force should be created as an
incidential result of the Administration's proposal. If a temporary work force
is to be created at all, it should be a result of a considered policy decision.
2. Employer Sanctions
The administration bill makes it unlawful for employers to hire undocumented
persons not authorized to work in the United States.98 It prescribes a civil
penality of not more than $1000 per person illegally employed. The Attorney
General is required, upon belief that an employer has engaged in a "pattern
or practice," 99 to bring action for civil penalities and injunctive relief. Violation
of the injunction could lead to criminal contempt citations.
The fundamental objection to the employer sanction provision is that it
does not deter the employment of undocumented persons, while it does afford
the employer an incentive for discrimination toward minorities, particularly
Chicanos. The administration concedes that discrimination is a likely result of
its employer sanction provision and it attempts to rectify this result by charging
federal agencies to make greater efforts to ensure that existing anti-discrimination
laws are enforced. 100 However, the administration does not propose to allocate
more funds or personnel for that purpose. Thus, while it does not appear that
employer sanctions will significantly reduce the employment of undocumented
persons, it does appear that this provision will engender discrimination in
employment against Chicanos and other Hispanics.10'
Immigration is a complex area of the law with many intricate ways in
which legal status can be obtained or lost, therefore, the locus of enforcement
falling on the employer is problematic since they lack the expertise to make
knowledgeable determinations of legal status. 102 This concern is compounded
by the lack of any definite standards for proof of legal. residence. An employer
will be reluctant to hire Chicanos, and other Hispanics, because of a legiti-
mate fear of bureaucratic entanglements and a desire to avoid a potential
97. It has been reported that Senator Eastland's opposition to past employer sanction legislation has
stemmed from his fear that it would restrict the availability of cheap labor for farmers. Senator
Eastland is chairman of both the Senate Judiciary Committee and its Subcommittee on Immigration.
See Note, The Undocumented Worker: The Controversy Takes a New Turn, 3 Chicano L. Rev. 166
(1976); see also Los Angeles Times, Mar. 16 1976, Pt. II, 1-2.
98. H.R. 9531 and S. 2252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §5 (1977).
99. What constitutes "pattern or practice" is not defined in the Administration's bill, and it could receive
varying interpretations. The Senate Section-by-Section Analysis notes that "the Government will be
required to show more than just accidental, isolated, or sporadic hiring of undocumented workers in
order to establish a "pattern or practice". 123 Cong. Rec. S. 18066 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
100. H.R. Doc. 95-202, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1977).
101. See W.A. Cornelius, Undocumented Immigration: A Critique of the Carter Administration Policy
Proposal, Migration Today, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Oct. 1977).
102. See Centro de Inmigracion, Laws Prohibiting Employment of Undocumented Immigrants: An Unjust
Solution To Economic Problems, Georgetown Law Center, at 3 (June 1977). See also Note, The
Rodino Bill On Illegal Aliens: A Legislative Note, 3 J. Legis. 39 (1976). The author states in regard
to employer sanctions:
This placed the burden of determining citizinship on the employer, who is not qualified to deal with
it. The determination can be technical and complicated, requiring knowledge of immigration laws and
constitutional law. Questions of derivative citizenship, loss of citizenship, and interpretation of the
proliferation of visas and other proofs are beyond the employer's competence.
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Justice Department lawsuit, with all its attendant financial costs and adverse
publicity. 103 Furthermore, the employer who wishes to discriminate can use the
pretext of "following the law" to shield his employment practices from allegations
of unlawful discrimination.
As a means of reducing the bill's discriminatory impact, the employer is
provided with a rebuttable presumption that he has not violated the law against
hiring undocumented persons upon proof that he has reviewed certain documents
designated by the Attorney General. 0 4 But given the large number of fraudulent
documents in use by undocumented persons,105 the rebuttable presumption may
not allay employers' concerns that they are inadvertently violating the law.
The employer could only securely rely on an identification card that the
government recognizes as fool-proof with the reviewing of that document being
a complete defense. In addition, the presumption is rebutted if the Attorney
General adduces evidence that the surrounding circumstances should have
alerted the employer to the illegality of the job applicant's status. Thus,
employers may be encouraged to circumvent the problem of determining legal
status by refusing to hire "foreign looking" persons.
The principal purpose of employer sanctions is to eliminate the employment
opportunities that draw undocumented persons to the United States. However,
the purported deterrence of the administration's employer sanction provision
must be examined. The question that needs to be asked is: Will it markedly
reduce the number of aliens attempting to enter the United States? Professor
Cornelius responds: "My answer and, I believe, that of most experts outside
the government who have studied the pheonomenon is negative."' 1 6 One of the
primary reasons offered by Professor Cornelius, and others in the area,1
0 7 is
that there is no effective enforcement apparatus, and the establishment of one
would entail a phenomenal cost.'0 8 The Cabinet-level Domestic Council Com-
mittee on Illegal Aliens graphically illustrated the enforcement problem observing,
"[I]ate in 1974, about 85 percent of the 1,600 person Border Patrol force was
assigned to the border, leaving the interior relatively unpoliced."' 109
Employers, some of which are stridently opposed to this legislation and
stand to gain financially from the employment of undocumented persons, are
asked to voluntarily comply with an employer sanction law. This is an unrealistic
expectation since many of these businesses have systematically violated minimum
wage laws, occupational safety and health laws, and tax withholding laws. 110
In sum, the administration bill will not be a deterrence to the employment of
undocumented persons due to the lack of an effective enforcement apparatus.
Furthermore, the safeguards against discrimination are of minimal value given
the pragmatic concerns and financial interests of employers.
103. MALDEF, supra note 83, at 5.
104. H.R. 9531 and S. 2252, 95th Cong., ist Sess., §5(c) (1977).
105. In 1974, immigration officers intercepted 15,825 fraudulant or altered immigration papers compared
to 11,587 for the previous year. Van Nuys News, August 20, 1974, at 5-A.
106. Cornelius, supra note 101, at 16.
107. Schey, supra note 96, at 13.
108. Illegal Aliens: Analysis and Background, supra note 11, at 57; for an estimate of the potential cost
of the total Carter immigration proposal, see Cornelius, supra note 101, at 20.
109. Preliminary Report, supra note 72, at 73. The report further states, "[als a result, if Mexican alien
now successfully penetrates the border region, he is essentially 'home free'." Id.




The Alien Adjustment and Employment Act is more an extention of past
legislative efforts than a careful analysis of the issue of illegal immigration.
While the bill contains some ameliorating provisions, overall, it is ill conceived
from a policy perspective, and its effectiveness is dubious. The lack of supporting
data makes it speculative, and preliminary research findings fail to support
the administration's policy rationale.
The substantive provisions of adjustment of status and employer sanctions
fail to accomplish their avowed purpose of regulating and reducing the presence
of undocumented persons in the United States. The permanent adjustment of
status provision represents a humane and practical approach to the problem
of regulating undocumented persons already here, but its seven-year residency
requirement makes it too restrictive to affect the vast majority of undocumented
persons. The temporary resident alien status is unacceptable because it legally
institutionalizes a second-class status for undocumented persons. In addition,
the fact that this provision only authorizes a five-year legal residency makes
it ineffective for drawing undocumented persons out from their extra-legal
existence. Hence, the likelihood that these people will not exercise their option
to be covered under this provision will probably defeat the objective of collecting
data.
The employer sanction provision does not provide a deterrent to the
employment of undocumented persons, but does provide an employer with an
incentive for employment discrimination against legal residents. The bill's
anti-discrimination safeguards are inadequate. Employer sanctions place minorities,
especially Chicanos, at a disadvantage in obtaining employment since they will
have the onus of proving their legal status to an unknowledgeable and suspicious
employer. One commentator explained the impact of employer sanctions in the
following terms: "If you want to increase the exploitation of immigrant workers
in this country, employer sanctions is probably the most effective way of doing
it.",l 1
The fundamental flaw in the Carter administration bill is that it seeks
unilaterally to solve this complex and problematic phenomenon. The problem
of illegal Mexican immigration should be analyzed from a bilateral perspective.
The "push" factors in the sender country must be addressed if legislation
aimed at the domestic "pull" factors are to prove successful. Failure to perceive
the international dimensions of this issue will lead to ineffective and unrealistic
solutions that may only serve to further aggravate the plight of the undocumented
worker and to jeopardize the statutory and constitutional rights of legal
residents.
111. Cornelius, supra note 101, at 16.
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